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STANDARDS IN AVIATION LEGISLATION
ALBERT LANGELUTTIG*
In accordance with the modern tendency, aviation legislation
in many of the states and in the federal government has delegated
to individuals or commissions the power to make regulations gov-
erning aircraft, airmen, airports, air instruction and other accom-
paniments of aviation. In so doing, the legislatures, in the per-
formance of their non-delegable functions, have adopted various
standards to govern the officers or commissions in the adop-
tion of rules or regulations. In one state, these standards have
been held too indefinite,' and the same problems will be presented
to other courts as the regulatory bodies become more aggressive
in enforcing the rules which they adopt. A survey, therefore, of
the standards adopted by the various states and the application to
them of the rules of law developed by the courts to govern the
legislatures in delegating regulatory power to administrative tri-
bunals may serve to prevent difficulty in the future.
I. THE STANDARDS
Only one state has so far failed to adopt some sort of regula-
tions for aviation. This one state is Georgia. Of the remaining
47 states, however, twenty-namely, Arizona 2 California,3 Dela-
ware," Florida,5 Iowa,' Kansas, 7 Mississippi,8 Missouri,9 Montana, 0
New York," North Carolina,' 2 Oklahoma,' Rhode Island, 4 South
Carolina,' 5 South Dakota,'8 Texas,' 7 Utah,' 8 Washington,' Wis-
*Lecturer on Administrative Law, Northwestern University School of Law,
and Member of the Chicago Bar.
Mr. Abraham Fishman, formerly Research Associate at the AIR LAW IN-STITUTE and Member of the Chicago Bar, assisted Mr. Langeluttig in the prep-
aration of this article by contributing the essential part of the research work
connected with the various state aeronautical laws.
1. State v. Larson, 10 N. J. Misc. 284, 160 At. 556 (1932).
2. Laws 1929, Ch. 38, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 493.
3. Stats. 1929, Ch. 850, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 418 cf. below note 50.
4. Laws 1929, Ch. 249, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 480.
5. Laws 1931, Ch. 14642, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 329.
6. Laws 1929, Ch. 135, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 552.
7. Laws 1931, Ch. 6, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 359.
8. Laws 1928, Apr. 26, 1929, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 543.
9. Laws 1929, p. 124, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 650.
10. Laws 1929, Ch. 17, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 655.
11. Laws 1928, Ch. 233, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 551; Laws 1931, Ch. 101, 1931
U. S. Av. R. 412.
12. Laws 1929, Ch. 190, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 701.
13. Laws 1931, Ch. 50, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 424.
14. Laws 1929, Ch. 1435, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 801.
15. Laws 1930, Act. 625, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 448.
16. Laws 1929, Ch. 70, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 821.
17. Laws 1929, Ch. 285, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 831.
18. Laws 1931, Ch. 20, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 461.
19. Laws 1929, Ch. 157, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 861.
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consin, 20 and Wyoming 21 -content themselves with the simple re-
quirements that airmen and aircraft flying over their territory shall
have federal licenses from the United States Department of Com-
merce under the Air Commerce Act.2 2  Indiana 2 adopts the same
requirements but does have in addition provision for municipal
airport commissions to construct airports and adopt rules and regu-
lations for their government. 24  Three of these states, namely,
Rhode Island, Washington and Wisconsin, add the requirement
that aircraft operating in the state shall comply with the Air Traffic
Rules of the Department of Commerce.
In these cases, of course, except possibly the last three states
mentioned, the problem of delegation of legislative power does
not arise. In the remainder of the states, however, some officer
or commission is given power to adopt rules and regulations to
govern aviation and some or all of its concomitants. In connec-
tion with these, the question arises: are the legislative standards
adopted sufficiently definite to avoid the charge that they delegate
legislative power to the administrative officers or commissions or
that state they delegate arbitrary power to them.
Thirteen states and one of the territories have adopted a stand-
ard definite enough but one which gives rise to another aspect of
the dictum against delegation of legislative authority. They refer
their administrative authorities to the federal government with
the injunction that they adopt rules and regulations embodying
the federal statutes and regulations and the amendments thereto.
This procedure is followed in Alabama, 2" Arkansas, 26 Idaho, 27
Maine,2 8 Maryland,29 Minnesota,30 New Jersey,31 New Hampshire, 2
New Mexico,33 North Dakota3 4 Ohio, 85 Vermont,36 Virginia, 87 and
Alaska.3 8 The purpose of such legislation is to keep state regula-
20. Laws 1929, Ch. 348, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 871.
21. Laws 1931, Ch. 106, 1931 U. S. AV. R. 475.
22. 414 Stat. L. 568, 1928 U. S. AV. R. 333.
23. Laws 1929, Ch. 171, 1929 U. S. AV. R. 527.
24. Laws 1929, Ch. 57, 1929 U. S. AV. R. 529.
25. Laws 1931, No. 152, 739, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 306, 310.
26. Law 1927, Act 17, 1928 U. S. AV. R. 438 ; Laws 1931, Ch. 9, 1931
U. S. AV. R. 317.
27. Laws 1929, Ch. 137, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 491; Laws 1931, Ch. 145, 1931
U. S. Av. R. 337.
28. Laws 1929, Ch. 265, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 574.
29. Laws 1929, Chs. 219, 318, 1929 U. S. Av. Rt. 578, 582.
30. Laws 1929, Ch. 290, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 629.
31. Laws 1931, Ch. 190, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 403; Laws 1932, Ch. 51, 1932
U. S. Av. R. 363.
32. Laws 1929, Ch. 182, 1929 U. S. AV. R. 670 ; Laws 1931, Ch. 36, 1931
U. S. Av. R. 401.
33. Laws 1929, Ch. 71, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 688.
34. Laws 1929, Ch. 85, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 711.
35. Laws 1931, No. 601, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 418.
36. Laws 1931, No. 126, 1931 U. S. AV. R. 464.
37. Laws 1930, Ch. 291, 1930 U. S. AV. R. 504.
38. Laws 1929, Ch. 75, 1929 U. S. AV. R. 393.
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tion of aviation uniform and in conformity with federal regulation
at all times, in spite of the infrequency of state legislative sessions.
The adoption of such a standard, however, raises the question of
delegation of state legislative authority to the federal government
and, under some state constitutions, the question of incorporation
of statutes by reference.3 9 On this last ground a nisi prius court
in New Jersey held the aviation act of that state invalid.40
The following state legislatures have indicated that their avia-
tion authorities should follow the federal lead, but have added other
standards as well to guide their administrative authorities in the
adoption of rules and regulations.
Colorado directs its Commission of Aeronautics to foster air
commerce and to make regulations "not in conflict with the Air
Commerce Act"; to cooperate with the federal Department of
Commerce; to provide for the rating of aircraft and to provide for
the periodic examination of airmen "as to their qualifications for
such service." "Licenses may be revoked or suspended
for violations of regulations promulgated by the Commission or'
of the federal regulations. 41 The Commission, thus, regulates only
airmen and aircraft. Unless the court finds that the statute refers
that body to the federal statutes and regulations for rules, there
is no standard set in adopting the rules for rating aircraft. The
standard set down to govern the Commission in establishing the
rules for licensing airmen, in addition to following the federal
lead, is to establish tests of their "qualifications." The act is
poorly drawn and is open to attack based upon the rule against
delegation of legislative authority. The act provides that its Com-
mission's regulations must not be in conflict with the federal act;
it fails to direct that they must conform thereto.
While the Illinois act needs some change in other details, the
legislative standards set for its commission are clearly set forth
and probably as definite as the nature of the subject matter of
regulation permits. It is distinctly provided that the regulations
of the Commission "shall be consistent with, and conform to" cur-
rent federal statutes and rules. In addition to this direction,
standards are set for each subject of regulation. The standard for
airports is "public safety," for air schools "health and safety of
students" and "public safety," for air markings and facilities and
traffic rules, "public safety and the safety of those engaged in aero-
39. See F. D. Fagg, Jr., "Incorporating Federal Law Into State Legis-
tlon," 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 199.
40. State v. Larson, 10 N. J. Misc. 284, 160 Ati. 556 (1932).
41. Acts 1927, Ch. 64, Sec. 4, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 454.
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nautics." Aircraft and airmen are required to have federal li-
censes. Safety should probably not be the only standard set; pro-
motion of aviation and possibly other standards might be added.
This much can be said for Illinois: no state exceeds its aviation
legislation in the definiteness and clarity of its design.4 2
Kentucky requires its aircraft and airmen to have federal li-
censes. It directs its Air Board to adopt traffic rules in conformity
with the federal rules and to inspect airports "for the purpose of
determining the safety and adequacy of such facilities for the op-
eration of aircraft.' 4  Here again, so far as airports are concerned,
the legislative standard is safety. The standard for traffic rules
is definite enough but the same aspect of delegation of legislative
power is presented as is presented by the states above referred
to which direct their commissions to the federal government for all
of its rules.
The effect of the Michigan legislation is substantially similar
to that of Illinois. The statute is, however, not so well drafted.
'Michigan requires its airmen to have federal licenses. Applica-
tions for aircraft registration must give the same information as
is required by federal authority and the commission is authorized
to make regulations governing aircraft and parachute inspection
as dictated by "public safety and for the safety of aircraft and
airmen." The commission is further authorized to regulate air-
ports and schools in the interest of "public safety," and the schools
in the interest of the health, safety and welfare of the students, and
is directed to enforce the federal legislation and regulations. To
this direction is added a proviso which prevents the charge that
Michigan is surrendering her "sovereignty" to the federal govern-
ment. The commission is authorized to deviate from federal rules
in the interest of public safety and the safety of aircraft and air-
men.
44
In Nebraska, the Railway Commission regulates aviation. Air-
men and aircraft must have federal licenses. The Commission is
directed to promulgate regulations in conformity with federal law
and regulation and in the interest of "convenience and safety in
the aircraft navigation." 45
Pennsylvania has created an Aeronautics Commission and sub-
jected to its regulation everything connected with aviation in a
redundant statute which takes the proverbial Philadelphia lawyer
42. Laws 1931, p. 194, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 342.
43. Laws 1932, No. 355, 1932 U. S. Av. R. 350.
44. Publ. Acts 1931, No. 53, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 391.
45. Laws 1929, Ch. 34, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 660.
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to decipher. Air traffic rules must conform to the federal rules. 46
In addition, traffic- rules, airmen, aircraft, airports, mechanics,
schools, markings and facilities are subject to regulation in the
interest of "safety, adequacy and sufficiency" and of the "safety
of patrons, employees, and the public. '47
Tennessee requires its airmen and aircraft to have federal li-
censes, or licenses issued by its own Division of Aeronautics, under
rules which conform, "so far as possible," to federal legislation
and regulation. Airports are licensed and governed under regu-
lations promulgated "to protect property and life." 8
In West Virginia, airmen and aircraft must have federal li-
censes. Its Board of Aeronautics are enjoined to adopt and enforce
the provisons of the Air Commerce Act and to regulate airports
in the interest of public safety and air schools in the interest of
the health and safety of students as well.409
As pointed out above 50 California simply requires that its air-
men and aircraft have federal licenses. Foreseeing the possible in-
validity of this provision, however, the act provides that in such an
event the Governor shall appoint an aviation commission which
shall adopt regulations to determine the airworthiness of craft and
skill, experience and qualifications of airmen in conformity with
federal statute and regulation."
Likewise, Indiana requires federal licenses for airmen and air-
craft.5 2  In addition, its statutes authorize municipalities each to
have boards of aviation commissions to regulate airports. They
may make rules and regulations not in conflict with state law and
federal law and regulation to govern their airports, but no stand-
ard is otherwise set for the rules and regulations.
Oregon requires a federal license for aircraft.58 Airmen must
have either a federal or a state license. 4  The Board of Aero-
nautics may adopt a schedule of educational and physical require-
ments for an airman's license s 5but the physical and education re-
quirements for a license 'have been set forth in the statute specific-
ally and never repealed. 0 The only regulation of airports is by
46. Laws 1929, Act 316, Sec. 901, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 777.
47. Laws 1929, Act 316, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 753; Laws 1931, Act 277,
1931 U. S. Av. R. 436.
48. Acts 1929, Ch. 5, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 499; Laws 1931, Ch. 73, 1931
U. S. Av. R. 454.
49. Laws 1929, Ch. 61, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 866; Laws 1931, Ch. 4, 1931
U. S. Av. R. 468.
50. Note 3.
51. Stats. 1929, Ch. 850, Sec. 11, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 421.
52. Note 23.
53. Laws 1931, Ch. 244, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 433.
54. Laws 1929, Ch. 352, Sec. 4, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 731.
55. Laws 1931, Ch. 218, Nos. 17-111, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 429.
56. Laws 1929, Ch. 352, Ch. 6(b), 1929 U. S. Av. R. 731.
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the Highway Commission who can designate parts of the "beach"
as an airport and in so doing prescribe conditions in "the best in-
terest of the general public" and "for the safety of the general
public. '5 7 The Oregon legislation has not been carefully drawn
and is ambiguous in many respects. It goes too far in the regula-
tion simply of airmen and aircraft and omits altogether the regu-
lation of airports, air schools, markings and facilities which is
peculiarly the function of the state.
Two states and one territory regulate aviation without refer-
ence to federal regulation. These are Massachusetts, Connecticut
and Hawaii.
The Connecticut legislation comes perilously close to giving
to its Commissioner of Aeronautics carte blanche in his regulation
of aircraft. Unless the standard of safety can be spelled out of
the statute, no standards are set for regulations. Air schools are
not regulated.' 8 Section 8 gives the Commissioner power to make
regulations governing airmen, aircraft, flying, airports, landing
fields and airways. The rule of safety is prescribed for devices.
Aircraft receive licenses by filing applications giving the informa-
tion required by the Commissioner and presenting a certificate of
"safety" signed by an inspector. Such licenses may be revoked or
modified as dictated by the safety of the public.5 For a license,
airmen must have an application, giving such information as the
Commissioner wants, approved by an. inspector of aviation. What
inducements are necessary to get the inspector's approval are not
specified. "Training" and "competency" are the only standards
which can be suggested as applying to airmen, except that they
must submit to a physical examination." Airports must have the
approval of the Commissioner, but there is no standard whatever
governing his grant of approval. 6' The Commissioner may also
adopt "safety-zoning regulations governing the area adjacent to an
airport."' 2  The entire act is probably vitiated by the unlimited
power given the Commissioner to waive the provisions of the act.63
In Massachusetts, the State Registrar licenses airmen and air-
ports. He is assisted by an advisory board of aeronautical ex-
perts. He is authorized to adopt rules and regulations consistent
with the aviation statutes "governing the use, operation and regis-
57. Laws 1931, Ch. 243, § 2 & 3, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 431.
58. Pub. Acts 1929, Ch. 253, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 451.
59. Sees. 9, 13, 14.
60. Sees. 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19.
61. Sec. 37.
62. Pub. Act 1929, Ch. 236, Sec. 5, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 467.
63. Publ. Acts 1929, Ch. 253. Sees. 20, 22, 26(a), 1929 U. S. Av. R. 459-460; cf. Welton v. Hamilton, 344 Ill. 82, - N. E. - (1931).
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tration of aircraft and the licensing of pilots." The statutes may,
however, be searched in vain for any very definite standards, if
any at all. The Registrar "may" license "competent" and "proper"
persons as pilots and register "suitable" aircraft. The "compe-
tency" of persons as pilots is determined by the advisory board
from a flight made by the applicant, and the "suitability" of aircraft
for registration is determined by the board by a flight and ground
inspection.64
In Hawaii, an aeronautical commission is given power to make
regulations governing aviation and all allied activities. No stand-
ard is set for these regulations and none can be spelled out of the
other provisions of the Act.65 If the territorial legislature is limited
by the same doctrines as limit the state and federal legislatures, the
regulations of the Hawaiian commission have no valid legal founda-
tion.
Since the Supreme Court has never taken seriously the injunc-
tion against delegation of legislative authority, a study of legisla-
tive standards in the Air Commerce Act becomes a matter of aca-
demic interest. The Supreme Court has never voided either state
or federal legislation on the ground of improper delegation of
legislative authority to administrative officers. There is much to
be said against this liberality towards the bureaucracy, but such
criticism cannot well be directed at the Air Commerce Act. By
this act, the Secretary of Commerce is authorized to promulgate
regulations governing aircraft, airmen, facilities and schools, and
adopt air traffic rules. The secretary of the Treasury is authorized
to extend customs and public health laws and regulations to air-
craft, and the Secretary of Labor immigration laws and regulations.
In granting registration to aircraft, the Secretary may require "full
particulars of the design and of the calculations upon which the
design is based and of the materials and methods used in the con-
struction." For airmen, the regulations are to provide for periodic
examinations to determine their "qualifications." The regulations
for air schools are to provide ratings "as to the adequacy of the
course of instruction, as to suitability and airworthiness of the
equipment, and as to the competency of the instructors." Air
traffic rules are to govern "navigation, protection, and identification
of aircraft . . . safe altitudes of flight . . . prevention of
collisions." With the exception of the standard set for the regula-
tions governing the rating of airmen, little could be added to the
64. Acts 1928, Ch. 388, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 590; Acts 1930, Ch. 33, Secs.
36, 38, 43, 45, 58, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 317.
65. Laws 1927, Act 238, 1929 U. S. Av. R. 488.
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legislative standards set for the regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of Commerce in connection with aviation.
II. AIRMEN
In setting standards for the regulation of airmen, the legisla-
ture must first foresee if the courts will class theirs as a profession
or just an occupation. If aviators form a profession, the standards
fixed by the legislature may be of the most general sort; if they are
classed with artisans, the legislative standards will probably have
to be a bit more definite.
The licensing of the professions is usually entrusted to boards
made up of persons engaged in the profession. The legislatures, in
view of this fact, are required to fix only the most general stand-
ards. The Supreme Court of California has said:
"The legislature, notwithstanding it may do things itself, may never-
theless authorize them to be done by ministerial officers or boards when it
believes that they can do them more conveniently and effectually than it can
itself. Especially may this be done when it is deemed proper by the legis-
lature to regulate in the interests of the public, through public commissions
or boards constituted- for that purpose, the pursuit of particular professions
or occupations, as, for example, that of physicians, dentists, druggists, en-
gineers, architects, and others which involve the exercise of skill and the
possession of special knowledge 'and experience. Such commissions or
boards are composed, as under this act the board of architects necessarily
must be, of persons technically skilled and trained in their profession or
occupation, and who are usually better able to determine whether an appli-
cant for a license or certificate to practice a given profession or occupation
is competent to do so, under reasonable rules and standards adopted by
them, than under those which might be prescribed by the legislature. And,
if in its wisdom, the legislature authorizes such a technically trained com-
mission or board to prescribe reasonable rules or fix a fair standard for
determining the proficiency of applicants for a license or certificate, it
cannot be said that a delegation within the constitutional inhibition of au-
thority to make laws is conferred, or any other authority given, than the
power necessary to be exercised by them to the end that the law, as com-
pletely enacted by the legislature, may properly be carried into effect."
The court held that requiring achitects to pass a "satisfactory
examination" given by the board established a sufficiently definite
standard.68 A similar result was reached in Rhode Island in the
case of dentists,6 and in Illinois in the case of teachers in the pub-
lic schools.6 s The requirement that persons applying for licenses
66. Ex parte McManus, 151 Cal. 331. 90 Pac. 902 (1907).
67. State v. Rosenkrans 30 R. I. 374, 75 Atl. 491 (1910).
68. People v. Flannigan, 347 111. 328, - N. E. - (1932). In addition
to passing a satisfactory examination, the Superintendent had to pass on the
applicant's personality. The case involves, of course, public employment to
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in the professions must be graduates of "reputable colleges" has
been repeatedly approved by the courts as laying down a sufficiently
definite guide for the licensing authorities."" Similarly, the licens-
ing of persons from other states who are "reputable dentists of
good moral character" has been approved. 70  The revocation of
licenses "for gross incompetency and recklessness," 71 "for any un-
professional conduct, ' 72 "for misrepresentation or fraud
or unfit or incompetent,' 73 and "other grossly unprofessional and
dishonorable conduct of a character likely to deceive or defraud
the public,"74 has been approved as sufficiently definite.
The courts are not so liberal with legislative power when it
comes to the occupations. The Illinois court could hardly have
upheld an act which gave the Board of Pharmacy power to issue
licenses to sell patent and proprietary medicines "under such re-
strictions as the Board may deem proper" against an attack that the
act gave the Board arbitrary power ;7 but the Ohio court was un-
duly strict when it declared invalid a statute which authorized an
examiner to issue licenses to steam engineers found upon examina-
tion to be "trustworthy and competent. '17  -Going almost to the
point of putting private detectives in a class with the professions,
and in spite of the fact that the licensing was done by the Secre-
tary of State instead of a professional Board, the Wisconsin court
upheld a statute which authorized a license if the applicant was
found to be of "good character, competency and integrity" ;77 and
the Oregon court seemed to take the prohibition against non-dele-
gation of legislative power as lightly as the Supreme Court of the
United States when it upheld a barbering act which defined what
constituted barbering and left the licensing itself, without any stand-
ard whatever, to the State Board of Examiners, saying:
"The nature and character of the profession, trade, or calling intended
to be licensed or regulated often demands technical knowledge and learn-
ing in order to designate accurately the qualifications which should be pos-
which it cannot be pretended in America that anybody has a right; but this
should not serve to distinguish this case from licensing of private professions.
69. Ex parte Whitley, 144 Cal. 167, 77 Pac. 879 (1904) ; People ex rel
Sheppard v. Dental Examiners, 110 Ill. 180 (1884) ("reputable dental college"
"which gives a full course of lectures and instruction In dental surgery"),
People v. Hawkinson, 324 Ill. 285. - N. E. - (1927) (school which is reput-
able and in good standing) ; Barmore v. State Bd., 21 Ore. 301, 28 Pac. 8
(1891) ("instruction in good standing") ; Douglas v. Noyes, 261 U. S. 165
(1923) ; Rutz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505 (1903).
70. State V. Croinbie, 107 Minn. 166, 119 N. W. 658 (1909).
71. Klafter v. State Bd., 259 Ill. 15, 102 N. E. 193 (1913).
72. Lehman v. Bd. of Accountancy, 263 U. S. 394 (19-).
73. Mandel v. Bd. of Regents, 250 N. Y. 173, - N. E. - (1928).
74. Forman v. State Bd., 157 Ky. 123, 162 S. W. 796 (1914). Other causes
of revocation.
75. Noel v. People, 187 Ill. 587, 58 N. E. 616 (1900).
76. Harmon V. State, 66 Ohio St. 249, 64 N. E. 117 (1902).
77. Pinkerton v. Buech, 173 Wis. 431, 181 N. W. 125 (1921).
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sessed by those designing to follow it. In the nature of things, this is a
matter outside the ordinary scope of legislative wisdom. The prescribing
of the proper qualifications of applicants for licenses by some agent of the
state learned in such profession or calling is not legislation but rather the
exercise of a mere administrative power."78
The licensing of automobile operators comes closest to that of
airmen. A Virginia ordinance provided that automobile operators
must obtain licenses from the Chief of Police upon examination
"as to his or her ability to safely and properly operate motor ve-
hicles . . and as to . . . knowledge of the traffic laws
. . .:and no permit shall be issued to such person unless such
examination shall disclose that he or she possesses such ability
and knowledge or in the judgment of the Chief of Police qualifies
such person to receive such permit." Thus far, the ordinance was
upheld. It continued, "the Chief of Police is authorized and di-
rected to revoke the permit of any driver who, in his opinion, be-
comes unfit to drive an automobile on the streets of the city." An
appeal was provided to the courts. The' court laid excessive
stress on the phrase "in his opinion" and rejected that part of the
ordinance as granting arbitrary power to the Chief."' In California,
on the other hand, a statute was upheld which provided for the
revocation of automobile licenses if it be found that the licensee "is
incompetent or unfit to drive for any reason authorizing the re-
fusal of a license or by reason of negligent or reckless driving which
has endangered life, limb, or property." The attack made against
this state was based upon non-delegation of "judicial" power, what-
ever that may mean, but the court treated the matter the same as
if it were the legislature trying to dodge its responsibility. 80
It would seem, therefore, that airmen are to be licensed by a
commission of airmen, and if the courts agree that they are pro-
fessional in character, standards of the most general character will
suffice to satisfy the legislative duty. Requiring airmen to pass
"satisfactory" examination is enough and if to this is added the
requirement that they be graduates of "reputable air schools," real
control of the schools may be exercised by the commission. If, on
the other hand, the courts find that airmen are not professional
but fall more nearly into the artisan class, more definiteness may
be required, such as designation of the subjects in which they must
78. State v. Briggs, 45 Ore. 366, 375, 77 Pac. 750 (1904). It might be
remarked that the alleged ignorance and incapacity of the Legislature was not
so bad as it might seem. One may feel sure that he may get accurate and
adequate assistance in the drafting of any statute however technical.
79. Thompson v. Smith, - Va. -, 154 S. E. 579 (1930).
80. Keck v. Superior Ct., - Cal. App. -, 293 Pac. 128 (1930).
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be proficient and the amount of experience to be required. A
statute which approaches these requirements is found in Oregon.81
III. AIR INSTRUCTION
The direct regulation of private education by the commissions
charged with licensing the product is apparently only to be found
in connection with aviation. The purpose of such regulation is to
protect the public both during and after instruction from the re-
sult of ignorance and the student from fraud and incompetence.
The problem is not a little complicated by the manner in which
flying instruction is given. Every airman who has once taken a
plane from the ground assumes he is able to impart to others a
full knowledge of the art of flying. The organized schools which
hold themselves as such are not as hard to supervise as the indi-
vidual who uses his own or his employer's plane to increase his
income in his spare time. The source of even greater trouble comes
from the flying clubs. A group of prospective flyers associate
themselves with a flyer, usually of too little experience, and invest
in a plane in which the one member who can fly is expected to give
all the others instruction. Aviation, just as automobiling, is safe;
it is the incompetent operator which introduces nearly all the
hazard into the enterprise, and the hazard is greater in the air.
One situation somewhat analogous to the problems presented
by the regulation of ins( ,ction is presented by the women and chil-
dren labor legislation. Wisconsin, a statute, providing as a
standard to govern regu ns made to protect females, that "no
female shall be employed ermitted to work . . . for such
periods of time *. as shall be dangerous or prejudi-
cial to the life, health, safet) .velfare of such female," was up-
held. 2 The Oregon Legislature created an industrial commission
to declare what "are unreasonably long hours" of employment for
women or children, "what surroundings or conditions-sanitary or
otherwise-are detrimental to the health or morals of women or of
minors," what wages are inadequate to supply the necessary cost
of living to any such workers and to maintain them in good health,"
and "what wages are unreasonably low for any such minor
workers." While, of course, the minimum wage regulation was
later declared invalid on other grounds,88 the Oregon court held
81. Note 56.
82. State v. Lange Canning Co., 164 Wis. 228, 157 N. W. 777 (1916). See
also Squires v. Brown, 170 Wis. 165, 174 N. W. 548 (1919).
83. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923).
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that each of the standards laid down was sufficiently definite. s4
Likewise in Minnesota, a minimum wage statute was held to estab-
lish a sufficient standard which authorized a commission to declare
a minimum "living wage" which was defined to be a wage "suffi-
cient to maintain the worker in health and supply him with the
necessary comforts and conditions of reasonable life. '8
Problems somewhat similar to those presented by instruction
may be found in the "Blue Sky" and banking legislation designed
to protect the public against fraud. The standard set for the licens-
ing of dealers in securities is "good business repute." This has
repeatedly been approved.86  In Wisconsin, the securities commis-
sion was required to issue licenses to applicants if the commission
were "satisfied as to his good business reputation and conduct."
In upholding -this statute, the court said:
"The Legislature might have added language prescribing in great de-
tail the qualifications of applicants for permits and the mode of ascertaining
those qualifications, but it is a question which such details would have tended
to confuse rather than enlighten."s7
A California case illustrates a method adopted by some courts to
make definite standards which appear at first to give uncontrolled
and arbitrary power to the administrative authority. In the words
of the court:
"The provisions of the Corporate Securities Act which allow the Com-
missioner of Corporations to issue a permit authorizing the applicant to
sell securities 'upon such terms and conditions as the Commissioner may in
said permit provide' must be read in connection with the context which
provides that the Commissioner must inquire into the methods of doing
business and shall ascertain if the same are fair, just and equitable and
that the methods used in disposing of them would not work a fraud upon
the purchasers thereof."88
The banking acts usually provide for the bank commissioners
or other adminstrative authority to take over banks if it be unsafe
for a banking corporation to continue business. This has been held
a sufficient standard.5 8 Likewise, in Illinois, the Department of
Trade and Commerce may require an additional bond if the exist-
ing bond "is insecure, exhausted, or otherwise doubtful" and this
84. Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Ore. 519, 139 Pac. 743 (1914).85. State ex rel v. Dist. Ct., 139 l inn. 30, 165 N. W. 478 (1917).
86. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539 (19-) ; Leach v. Daugherty,
73 Cal. App. 83. 238 Pac. 160; Kiley v. Chambers, 181 Cal. 589, 185 Pac. 855(1919) ("honesty, truthfulness and good reputation of the applicant"); See.
State v. Securities Comm., 145 Minn. 221, - N. W. - (1920) (licensing ofbanks of applicants be of good moral character and financial integrity, etc.).87. Kreutzer v. Westfahl, 187 Wis. 463, 294 N. W. 595 (1925) ; see also,Dominguez Land Corp. v. Daugherty, 196 Cal. 468, 238 Pac. 703 (1925).
88. Agnew v. Daugherty, 189 Cal. 446, 209 Pac. 34 (1922).
89. Nevada v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, 103 Pac. 407 (1909).
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standard has been held sufficiently definite.90 In Pennsylvania, the
Small Loan Act requires a license of lenders which is granted if
the Commissioner is satisfied that "the character and general fitness
is such as to warrant the conclusion that the business will be hon-
estly conducted," and it has been held that this is a sufficiently
definite standard.91 All courts, however, have not been so liberal
in dealing with standards fixed to prevent fraud. The Supreme
Court of Illinois invalidated one section of the securities act for
leaving unlimited discretion to the Secretary of State in fixing the
terms, conditions, and amount of the bond required. 2 The statute
was amended to read:
"In fixing the penalty of such bond, the Secretary of State shall in-
vestigate and take into consideration the proposed method of transacting
business and the financial standing of the applicant for registration, and the
experience, ability and general reputation for integrity of such applicant
and shall fix such a penalty as in his opinion will protect from loss
persons dealing with such applicant, if registered."
The court found, however, that this standard was not sufficiently
definite.98 With these should be compared a New York statute
which required milk dealers to obtain a license and give a bond.
The bond, however, was dispensed with if the applicant were a
person of domestic corporation, if the Commissioner of Agriculture
were "satisfied from an investigation of the financial condition of
such person or domestic corporation that such person or domestic
corporation is solvent and possessed of sufficient assets to reason-
ably assure compensation to probable creditors." The New York
Court of Appeals approved of this statute.
9 4
In licensing air instruction, the very novelty of this sort of
regulation makes it desirable to leave as much discretion as pos-
sible with the administrative authority. On the whole, the cases
warrant the adoption by the legislatures of only general standards.
The cases last cited, however, indicate that, wherever possible,
standards should be made definite so as to avoid discrimination.
In drafting legislation for air schools, it would be acting on the
side of wisdom to establish some more definite standard than
"safety." It would be wise to prescribe some rule for the experi-
ence of instructors and for the curriculum and equipment in gen-
eral. While this would not limit the essential power of the com-
90. People v. Stokes, 281 Ill. 159, 118 N. E. 87 (1917).
91. Commonwealth v. Puder, 261 Penn. 129, 104 At. 505 (1918).
92. People v. Federal Surety Co., 336 Il1. 472 (1929).
93. People v. Beekman, 347 Ill. 92 (1932).
94. People v. Beakes Dairy Co., 222 N. Y. 416, 119 N. E. 115 (1918).
See also Klein v. Barry, 182 Wis. 255, 196 N. W. 457 (1923).
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missions any more than present standards do, it would give the
courts more excuses for stepping in when they found arbitrary
action on the part of the administrative authorities and so they
would be more likely to approve of the legislation.
IV. AIRPORTS AND LANDING FIELDS
The regulation of airports and landing fields presents to the
administrative authorities, the courts, and the legislatures some of
the most difficult problems in adjusting the various interests in-
volved. If the fields be public property, it must be determined
whether they are to be treated as the property of the state to do
with as it wishes or as common property of the citizens which
each has a right to use under proper regulations. If the fields be
privately owned, the rights of absolute ownership guaranteed by
the constitution must be adjusted to necessary regulation in the
interest of public health, morals, safety and convenience.
It is not likely that the publicly owned flying fields will be
treated simply as the private property of the states. If they are
so treated, the standards may be such as the legislature determines.
The state may bestow its bounty under such conditions as it pleases.
Thus, South Carolina permitted the taking of phosphate rock from
its streams by licenses granted in the discretion of the adminis-
trative authority if they deem it "best for the interests of the State
and the proper management of the interests of the State in such
deposit."'°5  A federal statute permitted the felling of trees on
public lands "subject to such rules and regulations as the Secretary
of the Interior may prescribe for the protection of the undergrowth
and for other purposes." This standard was upheld by the
Montana territorial court. "" Another federal statute creating forest
reservation from public lands authorized the Secretary of Agri-
culture to "make such rules and regulations . . . as will insure
the objects of such reservation, namely, to regulate their occupancy
and use, and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction."
This standard was approved by the United States Supreme Court. 97
The navigable waters of the United States have been treated as
proprietary by the federal government. Obstructions to free navi-
gation of them must have the approval of the Secretary of War
and bridges must be changed if they constitute "unreasonable ob-
95. Port Royal Mining Co. v. Hagood, 30 S. C. 519, 9 S. E. 686 (1888).
96. U. S. v. Williams, 6 Mont. 379, 12 Pac. 851 (1887).
97. U. S. V. Grirmaud, 220 U. S. 506 (1911).
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structions." This standard has been approved by the Supreme
Court.9 8
The airports and landing fields, however, should be treated like
the streets and other common property to which all citizens have
access of right under regulations made by public authorities under
very definite standards. Indefinite standards vesting arbitrary
power in administrative authorities will not do. In Arkansas, the
State highway commission was given power "to make all necessary
and reasonable rules" to carry out the provisions of the State
Highway Act and "to regulate the traffic." The commission
adopted a rule requiring pedestrians to travel on the left hand side
of the road. The rule was held unauthorized and the statute in-
definite. 9 In Connecticut, an ordinance requiring a license to make
speeches on sidewalks or in squares or parks had to be obtained
from the Chief of Police. This ordinance was held invalid because
no standard whatever was laid down 00 although it could have been
held that the public peace was the standard to be ascertained from
the nature of the regulating officer. Likewise, an ordinance re-
quiring permission of the Board of Trustees to drive heavy vehicles
on boulevards was ield bad in Illinois as granting arbitrary
power.10 ' These last two cases were considered very loose legisla-
tion, but the ordinances might have been upheld by looking to the
scheme of the legislation. They indicate that regulations governing
the use of airports and landing fields, if they are treated like other
places of popular recourse like streets, parks and commons, will
have to be drawn under rather definite standards established by the
legislatures so as to prevent the administrative authorities from dis-
criminating unjustifiably between the users of the fields.
The right of a state to regulate the use of private property
must rest upon the state's police power to legislate in the interest of
public health, morals, safety and convenience, and regulation must
stop where these stop. The standards set up must clearly limit the
regulating body to these ends.
Where the use of private property involves the privilege of
using public property, as railroads crossing public highways, the
standards have been vague enough. The uniform rule is "public
98. Union Bridge Co. v. U. S., 204 U. S. 364 (1906) ; Monongahela Bridge
Co. v. U. S., 216 U. S. 177 (1909) ; Hannibal Bridge Co. v. U. S., 221 U. S. 194
(1910).
99. Snow v. Biggs, 172 Ark. 835, - S. W. - (1927).
100. State v. Coleman, 96 Conn. 190, 113 At. 385 (1921).
101. Cicero Lumber Co. v. Town of Cicero. 176 111. 9, 51 N. E. 758 (1898).
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safety." Grade separations must be made if "public safety" re-
quires.10
2
The sorts of standards which have been upheld, although
private property is involved, are illustrated by the following cases.
A statute requiring licenses for clothes cleaning establishments pro-
vided that licenses were to be refused if upon investigation it ap-
peared that "the establishment, plans, specifications, premises, or
character or ability of such applicant are not in compliance with
the law" or "in any manner jeopardizes the public welfare" or if
in the opinion of administrative authority the proposed establish-
ment would be "a.menace to the public welfare and safety.' 0 8
In Wisconsin, the "good order of the city" was considered
sufficiently definite to govern the licensing of junk shops. 10 4 In
Illinois, a laundry licensing ordinance was upheld which fixed the
standard as "dangerous or detrimental to the health of the city or
the health of the persons employed therein." The standard was
sufficiently definite when read in the light of the entire ordinance. 0 5
On the other hand, statutes setting standards which appear
to be definite as compared to most of those which have gone before
have been considered too vague when private property was in-
volved. The concept of what is a- nuisance has been pretty well
established by the courts over many centuries, yet a statute giving
a health commission power to declare what is or is not a nuisance
was held void. 06 In Illinois, an ordinance requiring a permit to
change an apartment house into a "rooming house" was declared
too indefinite,10 7 and a statute which provided:
"Wherever any of said officers shall find any building or other structure
which, for want of proper repair, or by reason of age and dilapidated con-
dition, or for any cause, is especially liable to fire, and which is so situated
as to endanger other buildings or property therein . . . they shall order
the same to be removed or remedied,"
was held to be vague and indefinite.'0 8
In licensing and regulating airports, it appears that no definite
and clearly understandable rule may be gleaned from the cases to
guide the legislatures to establishing standards. Regulation of
property, public or private, is involved and that is sacred to the
courts.
102. Milwaukee v. R. R. Comm., 162 Wis. 127, 155 N. W. 948 (1916);
Alton & So. 1. 12. v. -Vandalia R. R. 268 I1. 68, 108 N. E. 800 (1915) ; Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. County of Lake, 287 Ill. 337, 122 N. E. 526 (1919).
103. Carter v. Stevens, - Cal. -, 295 Pac. 28 (1930).
104. Milwaukee v. Ruplinger. 155 Wis. 391, 145 N. W. 42 (1914).
105. Moy v. Chicago, 309 I1. 242, 140 N. E. 845 (1923).
106. Globe School Dist. v. Bd. of Health. 20 Ariz. 208, 179 Pac. 55 (1919).
107. Chicago v. Matthies, 320 Il1. 352. 151 N. E. 248 (1926)
108. People v. Sholem, 294 Il1. 204, 128 N. E. 377 (1920).
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V. AIRCRAFT AND NAVIGATION FACILITIES
Regulations governing aircraft and facilities may be of two
sorts. They may be adopted in the interest of health or in the
interest of safety. In adopting standards for public health regu-
lations, the legislatures have substantially abdicated in favor of
the doctors. Food and drug acts have stopped with directing the
health authorities to fix "minimum standards of foods and drugs"
and these have been sustained.109 Likewise, the Secretary of the
Treasury has been authorized to fix "uniform standards of purity,
quality, and fitness for consumption of all kinds of teas." 110 In
Washington, a statute giving its board of health power to define
contagious diseases was upheld,' and one giving its commission
of agriculture power to specify which diseases and pests of trees
are "injurious" was approved.1 12 A Texas statute which author-
ized its Live Stock Commission to "establish such quarantine lines
and sanitary rules as it may deem necessary" was upheld. 13  In
Michigan a statute authorizing the detention of persons and prop-
erty "exposed to disease" or "likely to carry infection" was con-
sidered to be sufficiently definite." 4
With these cases should be compared a California statute
which was held invalid. It provided:
"If, in any factory . . . any . . work is carried on by which
dust, filaments, or injurious gases are generated or produced that are liable
to be inhaled by the persons employed therein, and it appears to the Com-
missioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics that such inhalations could,
to a great extent, be prevented by the use of some mechanical contrivance,
he shall direct that such contrivance shall be provided." 115
Turning from health to contrivances for safety, the same
diversity appears. In Ohio, an ordinance provided for the licens-
ing of laundries. Licenses were to be granted if ventilation were
"adequate" and if location, construction, ventilation and sanitary
drainage were "sufficient to properly protect the public health."
This statute was upheld with the declaration that it was impossible
to fix a more definite standard. 1 8 In Massachusetts a statute was
upheld which directed its Board of Labor and Industries "to in-
vestigate employments and places of employments to determine
109. Isenhour v. State, 157 Ind. 517, 62 N. E. 40 (1901).
110. Buttflield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 (1903).
111. State ex rel v. Superior Ct., 103 Wash. 409, 174 Pac. 973 (1918)
see also People v. Robertson, 302 Ill. 422, 134 N. E. 815 (1922).
112. Carstens v. De Sellern. 82 Wash. 643, 144 Pac. 934 (1914).
113. Mulkey v. State, 83 Tex. C. R. 1, 201 S. W. 991 (1918).
114. Hurst v. Warner, 102 Mich. 238, 60 N. W. 440 (1894).
115. Schaezlein v. Cabannis, 135 Cal. 466, 67 Pac. 755 (1902).
116. Yee Bow v. Cleveland. 99 Ohio St. 269, 124 N. E. 132 (1919).
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what suitable safety devices and other reasonable means and re-
quirements for the prevention of accidents should be adopted, and
to make reasonable rules, regulations and orders the prevention of
accidents. ' '117  Public utility appliances are uniformly left to the
railroad commission with only general standards. For instance, an
Indiana statute authorized its commission to determine "what would
be the most practicable and efficient headlight for all purposes" and
required railroads to adopt this light. The statute was held to fix
a sufficiently definite standard. 18 The United States Supreme
Court, of course, upheld a North Carolina statute which provided
that all illuminating oils used for sale shall be subject to inspection
by the Commissioner of Agriculture who was authorized to make
rules and adopt standards of "safety, purity or absence from ob-
jectionable substances and luminosity." The Commissioner was
authorized to forbid the sale of oil "either unsafe or of inferior
illuminating quality."' 19
With these cases may be compared a statute of Texas which
regulated fire escalpes in painful detail and then was declared in-
valid because of certain discretion given to the State Fire Marshall.
The statute required each building to be equipped with an "ade-
quate fire escape." The statute defined what is an "adequate fire
escape" in terms of materials, types, and strengths. The statute
then continued:
"It is hereby made the duty of the State Fire Marshall to prepare and
promulgate minimum specifications for the construction and erection of each
type of fire escape authorized by this act, which specifications shall be based
upon a working stress of not less than sixteen thousand pounds to the square
inch for steel, twelve thousand pounds for wrought iron and seven hundred
for concrete, provided that interior fire escapes be enclosed with non-com-
bustible material, and that all door and window openings be properly pro-
tected with self-closing fireproof shutters, and that all stairway escapes,
interior and exterior, be continuous and suitably connected with the roof of
the building." 120
Another Texas statute which permitted its highway commission to
authorize the carrying of heavier loads than provided in the statute
on roads "of sufficient construction to carry without material in-
jury" the larger load was held invalid.121
Here again some direction may be found for standards in
117. Sciola's Case, 236 Mass. 407, 128 N. E. 666 (1920).
118. Vandalia R. R. v. R?. R. Comm., 182 Ind. 382, 101 N. E. 85 (1914).
119. Red C. Oil Co. v. Bd. of Agriculture, 222 U. S. 380 (1911). It is
always wise if possible to bring a doubtful standard before the Supreme Court
of the United States first.
120. Dockery v. State, 93 Tex. Cr. 220, 247 S. W. 508 (1923).
121. Ex parte Faisan, 93 Tex. Cr. 403, 248 S. W. 343 (1923).
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regulation of air navigation facilities. Health measures may be
adopted with general standards. More care must be taken to fixing
standards for devices. The standards for airships are probably
most closely analogous to the cases above discussed regarding
facilities. The general regulation of this mode of transportation
presents problems which have few analogies. No other means of
transportation is thus regulated.
VI. GENERAL
Before turning from the problem of standards involved in the
regulation of aeronautics by administrative authorities to the prob-
lem of delegation of state legislative authority to the federal gov-
ernment, a few interesting cases on legislative standards in general
might be interesting and applicable to various problems that may
arise in connection with aeronautics.
A Massachusetts statute provided that the commissioners of
pilots for the harbor of Boston might recommend to the Gov-
ernor and council such changes or modifications of the pilotage
regulations as they deemed proper and such changes when ap-
proved by the Governor and council should have the force of law.
This statute was held to be a police regulation and did not con-
stitute an invalid delegation of legislative authority.
122
A Washington statute authorized the Department of Labor
and Industries "to declare any occupation or work to be extra
hazardous." The court upheld this statute declaring the word
"extra hazardous" defines itself. 123
A Massachusetts statute directed the building of a sewerage
system to serve a part of the state containing several cities. The
act provided that certain commissioners should apportion the cost
of the system among the several cities "in such manner as they
deemed just and equitable." The statute was attacked on the
ground that "no standard or rule is prescribed." The statute was
upheld. The courts said "it is difficult to see how anything like
an exact rule or standard of apportionment can be fixed .
all that can be done by any tribunal would be to take in to view all
the various elements and considerations that might appear.' 24
This case is interesting because it asserts the principle that where
standards are hard to establish they need not be set up.
A recent Vermont case is interesting because it involves a
122. Martin V. Witherspoon, 135 Mass. 175 (1883).
123. State v. Bayles, 121 Wash. 215, 209 Pac. 20 (1922).
124. Kingman et at. Petitioners, 153 Mass. 566, 27 N. E. 778 (1891).
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subject of regulation very close to aviation. An act providing for
the regulation of motor carriers in the stat6 by a commission set
as the standard "the general good of the state." The Supreme
Court of Vermont upheld this statute saying "that [standard] is
the pole star by which the commission is to be guided in the dis-
charge of the duties imposed upon it . . . None other is re-
quired.' 125  About this case it may be remarked that if the other
forty-seven states follow the lead of Vermont, the problem of
standards in aviation legislation is a simple one.
A Wisconsin statute directed its Railroad Commission to regu-
late the height at which water must be maintained in reservoirs
operated by reservoir companies. The standards set were "in the
interest of the public rights" and "to promote safety and protect
life, health and property." The standards were approved. 12
It may be said about the aviation legislation above discussed
that the legislative standards thereby adopted were none too definite.
The generality of the standards, however, finds support in most of
the cases presented to the courts. Here and there are found
cases which should give pause to the abdication of the legislatures
to the bureaucracy. The only generalization that may be drawn
from all the cases is that the courts will approve of general stand-
ards when the administrative authorities for whose guidance the
standards are set up are likely to act wisely and judiciously. The
courts will not, however, approve of any scheme of legislation
which delegates too broad and arbitrary powers to administrative
authorities who are likely to abuse those powers, especially if the
rights of private property are involved. It may be said of the
aviation legislation that the aviation administrators in the various
states are worthy of respect, and that, in the evolution of a proper
scheme of regulation for this comparatively new activity, wide
discretion should be allowed to these authorities. It may be that
as the problems involved in the regulation of aviation become better
understood the courts will become more strict in their scrutiny of
the legislative standards set up.
VII. CONFORMITY
There remains to be discussed in conclusion the problems pre-
sented by the almost universal purpose asserted in the aviation
legislation that state regulation should conform to federal.
125. In re James, 99 Vt. 265, - Atil. - (1926).
126. Chippewa Improvement Co. v. 1. 1. Comm., 164 Wis. 105, 159 N. W.
739 (1916).
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In this field is found the only case in which the Supreme Court
has applied the prohibition against the delegation of legislative
authority to invalidate an act of any legislature, state or federal.
Congress provided that the federal district courts should have ex-
clusive jurisdiction of all civil cases within the admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction "saving ... to all claimants the rights and remedies
under the Workmen's Compensation law of any state." By a five
to four decision in an opinion by Mr. Justice McReynolds the
Supreme Court declared the "saving clause invalid as a delegation
of Congress' legislative authority.' 1 27 The decision is incompre-
hensible and entirely out of line with cases decided by the Supreme
Court both before and since. It finds some support, however, in
an early Kentucky case which held that Congress was not to be
considered to have adopted legislation of that state enacted sub-
sequent to the act of Congress which provided that prison bounds
for Federal prisoners should be the same as those for state prison-
ers in the same institutions. 12
In a somewhat earlier case the Supreme Court of the United
States approved a delegation by Congress even to an unofficial
body. The Interstate Commerce Commission was directed to adopt
as the standard height of drawbars for freight cars that designated
by the American Railway Association.
129
The states have likewise approved similar legislation. In Cali-
fornia a statute providing that a board of architects should be
appointed from the American Institute of Architects was held
valid.'2 0 Statutes requiring the applicants for registration as phy-
sicians and surgeons to present diplomas issued by a medical school
having the requirements by the Association of American Medical
Colleges have been upheld. 1' It was held in Alabama that no
improper delegation of legislative authority was involved in a statute
which directed the trustees of the state university to remove its
medical school from Mobile whenever the Council on Education
of the American Medical Association informs the trustees that the
Association proposed to lower the classification of the Medical
School.1 ' On the other hand, a Kansas statute was held invalid
which provided "all electrical wiring shall be in accordance with
the national electrical code,"'31 3 and a California statute was held
127. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart. 253 U. S. 149 (1919).
128. Moore v. Allen, 30 Ky. 651, - S. E. - (1932).
129. St. Louis & Iron Mountain By. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281 (1908).
130. Ex parte McManus, 151 Cal. 331, 90 Pac. 702 (1907).
131. Arwine v. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 151 Cal. 499, 91 Pac. 319
(1907); State v. Bonham, 93 Wash. 489, 161 Pac. 377 (1916).
132. Stevens v. Thames, 204 Ala. 487, 86 So. 77 (1920).
133. State V. Crawford, 104 Kan. 141, 177 Pac. 360 (1919).
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invalid which provided for the appointment of a brand and live
stock inspector upon the request of the Cattle and Horse Raisers
Association.1
3 4
In the field of prohibition of intoxicating liquors aviation gets
one of its precedents for a widespread attempt to bring state legis-
lation and regulation into conformity with federal law. In the
days before national prohibition the Webb-Kenyon act which pro-
hibited the importation of intoxicants into dry states was upheld,
even though the states became dry subsequent to the enactment of
the Webb-Kenyon Act.135 When national prohibiflon came, the
courts of the states uniformly held that their legislative authority
could not be delegated to Congress by acts which attempted to
adopt future definitions of intoxicating liquors made by the federal
Congress or the Supreme Court of the United States.' It is to be
noted, however, that the future amendments of the acts of Congress
were adopted in these cases by the statutes themselves.
The states also look to the federal government for leadership
in the adoption of pure food legislation. In Pennsylvania, an act by
which the legislature attempted to adopt the federal Pure Food and
Drug Act together with the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder was held invalid, both as a delegation of legislative
authority and also as contrary to a provision of the state consti-
tution forbidding the incorporation of statutes by reference to title
only.13 7  In California, however, a federal court upheld an act of
the legislature which-adopted the standards of purity for food
products filed by the Federal Department of Agriculture. 8
In a number of states pure food laws which have adopted the
standards of the United States, Pharmacopoeia, the National For-
mulary or the American Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia have been in-
terpreted to refer to editions in existence at the time of the enact-
ment of the law, and, in spite of the unofficial sources of these
works, the acts have been upheld. 3 9
The federal bankruptcy act of 1898 recognized the exemption
134. State v. Hines, 94 Ore. 607, 186 Pac. 420 (1920).
135. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (1891) ; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western
Md. RBy. Co., 242 U. S. 311 (1917); State v. Doe, 92 Kan. 212, 139 Pac. 1169(1914); State v. Mo. Pac. RBy. Co., 96 Kan. 609, 152 Pac. 777 (1915); State
V. U. S. Express Co., 164 Ia. 112, 145 N. W. 451 (1914).
136. Maine v. Gauthier, 121 Me. 522, 118 At]. 380 (1922) ; State v. Weber,
125 Me. 319, 133 At]. 738 (1926) ; Ex parte Burke. 190 Cal. 326, 212 Pac. 193(1923) ; In re Opinion of Justices, 239 Mass. 606, 133 N. E. 453 (1921).
137. Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 39 Pa- Super. 338. - N. E. - (1909).
The second reason relied upon by the court was used in New Jersey to in-
validate their aviation act; see below note 141.
138. Cleveland Macaroni Co. v. Bd. of Health, 256 Fed. 376 (1919).
139. Commonwealth v. Sweeny, 61 Pa. Super. 367 (1915) : State v. Emory,
55 Ohio St. 364, 45 N. E. 319 (1896) ; State v. Holland, 117 Me. 277, 104 Atl.
159 (1918).
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laws of the several states then in force and subsequently adopted
and the act has been upheld.
14 0
There must be discussed finally the only case which has con-
sidered standards in aviation legislation.' 4' A nisi prius court
held that in authorizing the commission to adopt uniform field rules
for airports, no standard whatever was set up to guide the actions
of the administrative authority. It seems that this holding shows
undue blindness on the part of the court. The very term, field rules,
includes its own standard."' The court then went on to hold that
while it was proper for the legislature to adopt "as its own the
federal public policy" the provision of the state constitution pro-
viding "no act shall be passed which shall provide that any exist-
ing law or any part thereof shall be made or deemed a part of the
act, or which shall enact that any existing law or any part thereof
shall be applicable except by inserting it in such act" made invalid
the incorporation of the federal statutes by reference to their name
only, and that, without this reference, no standard whatever was
fixed to guide the state Aviation Commission. The least that can
be said of such a decision is that the court displayed an unusual
amount of obtuseness. The statute did not purport to adopt the
federal legislation and regulations as a part of the New Jersey
act; it simply referred the Aviation Commission to Washington
for its guiding rule. Such a standard is much more definite than
usually approved even in New Jersey.
The Larson case is the only case which has, so far, passed
upon the aviation statutes which refer their aviation administrators
to the federal government for their guidance. Aviation is of such
a nature that uniform regulation is essential. It was indeed a bril-
liant innovation for the states to adopt simply uniformity as a
general standard and to direct their administrative authorities to
keep state regulation of intrastate .flying abreast of the compre-
hensive federal regulation of interstate flying. It is to be hoped
that when the highest courts of the state come to pass upon the
question, statesmanship rather than pedantry will motivate the
decisions.
140. Hanover NatN. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181 (1902).
141. State v. Larson, 10 N. J. Misc. 284, 160 AtI. 556 (1932). See com-
ment 3 JOURNAL or AIR LAW 456.
142. See note 123.
